POLICE EVENTUALLY GET THERE!

Hi all, I thought you may find this case interesting where the murderer carried out the most horrific attack but the police stated they had a good idea who it was but could not prove it. They had evidence but it was insufficient. A few years after a retrial he was convicted, as you will see when this man attempted to appeal his convictions but sadly not before he had killed again and also attempted to kill his mother.

Are there some parallels to be drawn here, in a way, I think there are!

Viv x


Inquest into decapitation fails to satisfy grieving family
By Steve BogganTuesday, 20 March 2001
For many bereaved families, an inquest, just like a funeral, is part of dealing with the loss of a loved one in tragic circumstances. But for the family of Julian Sanders it has meant that the person who cut off his head while he was still alive may never be punished.
Yesterday, an inquest into Julian's death last May recorded a verdict that he was unlawfully killed. However, the fact that it took place at all was an indication that police efforts to find his killer are at best becalmed, at worst stymied.
Normally, inquests are held in abeyance pending police investigations, but The Independent has learned that Julian's murder file has been put on "cold case review". That means officers will investigate new evidence if it comes in, but they have stopped searching for the perpetrator. They believe they know who killed Julian, but they can't prove it.
Julian, 20, from Shrewsbury, was found dead in a field in Longbridge, Birmingham, 70 miles from his home, on 29 May last year. His head was found a few feet from his body. A post-mortem examination revealed that he had been hit on the back of the head but he was still alive when it was crudely hacked off. Decapitation is not unusual in murder. It is often used as a means of concealing the victim's identity after death. In Julian's case, decapitation was the cause of death.
By all accounts, Julian was a gentle man without any enemies. He was on medication for a mild form of schizophrenia and he had been taking it up to his death. If anything, his family said, the medication made him slightly docile. Early reports in the Birmingham press that he was murdered as part of a drugs turf war were nonsense; he had never been in trouble. Why, therefore, he should come to such a terrible end was something that baffled police.
They soon found out, however, that he had befriended a man - platonically - and they believe that one of that man's friends had taken against Julian. Jealousy, detectives believe, may have been the motive for his murder.
The Independent has been given details of the evidence against the suspect, but it is purely circumstantial. There is no forensic evidence linking the man to Julian's death. The police investigation revolved around a telephone call made by Julian, evidence that the suspect may have a predisposition to violence, and the discovery of Julian's watch in the suspect's home.
The suspect said the watch had broken and Julian had asked him to throw it away. Without forensic evidence, the decision not to prosecute anyone at this stage appears to be correct. But it is a painful decision for Julian's family.
"It is a bad feeling in the gut," said his father, Russell Sanders Royle, 45. "Not only because the police have worked so hard, but also because this person is still out there. He has not paid for my son's death and he could well kill again.
"The past 10 months have been terrible for the family. Julian was a lovely lad and we all miss him so much. Unfortunately, we won't even begin to put this behind us until his killer is caught."
When Julian was murdered, the national media took no interest in the case. Now the family want to concentrate on appealing to the public for the tiniest shred of evidence that might bolster West Midlands Police's chances of a conviction.
It is understood the post-mortem examination revealed that Julian's skin had been hit with water from a high-pressure hose. Detectives believe he was killed and decapitated in an isolated farm or industrial outbuilding, but there are thousands across the county.
"We want anyone who rented or lent an outbuilding out last May bank holiday to tell the police," said Avi Sanders Royle, 49, Julian's stepmother. "There may have been unexplained blood in there or some suspicious characters. Any information, no matter how irrelevant it may seem, could help."
A Home Office pathologist, Dr Edmund Tapp, told the inquest that, mercifully, Julian had not been conscious when his head was removed. But he added: "There was a good deal of blood in the lungs, indicating that the deceased was alive when his head was severed."
Recording a verdict of unlawful killing, the coroner, Dr Richard Whittington, said: "This was a savage assault ... brutal, callous. It must have been in some sense premeditated as somebody was armed with horrible weapons put to terrible use."
Detective Inspector Steve Billingham, second in command of the investigation, said the murder was on "cold case review" but was not formally closed. "We still have officers on hand to receive calls and we will investigate any new information people give us," he said.
For Julian's family, the trauma goes on. Mrs Sanders Royle said the police involved in Julian's case had done a fine job, but she has now lost faith in the justice system.
"I take consolation from the fact that whoever murdered Julian is probably in his own private hell," she said. "If he doesn't get justice in this world, he'll get it in the next."
Last week, The Independent tried to speak to the suspect. He refused to be interviewed about the case, repeatedly replying "No comment" to all questions posed.

and after his conviction, this manipulative liar attempts to appeal and say well I was mad! Yes we know but you are still very dangerous, I hope they never let him out!


THE HON MR JUSTICE GIBBS
MR JUSTICE GIBBS : 1. On 16th October 2003 at the Chester Crown Court Maurice John Latus (“the offender”) was convicted, after a retrial, of the offence of murder. I passed a sentence of life imprisonment upon him for that offence.2. On 19th June 2002 at the same court before Mr Justice Stephen Richards (as he then was) the offender had pleaded guilty to wounding with intent to do grievous bodily harm. Two days later, upon being re-arraigned on a separate charge of murder, he pleaded guilty to manslaughter. He was also tried by a jury on the charge of murder referred to at paragraph 1, but the jury failed to agree. He was convicted of attempted murder in relation to a separate incident.3. Two unsuccessful appeals against conviction for murder were made on the offender's behalf, the later appeal being dismissed by the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) on 19th December 2006.4. There were three victims of these offences. The victim of the offences of wounding with intent and of murder was Julian Sanders, a work colleague and friend of the offender. The victim of the manslaughter was Colin Faulkes, the offender's landlord. The victim of the attempted murder was the offender's mother. I now set our a brief chronology of events.5. From about 1985, the offender lived in a rural property in Shropshire known as “The Gatehouse” and owned by Faulkes. The offender alleged that Faulkes had physically and sexually abused him over many years, but that he could not leave the house because he had nowhere to go. The offender's relationship with his mother had been difficult. She had married a much younger man, a pupil of hers, in the early 1980s.6. The offender and Sanders worked together from 1997 onwards and became friends. They saw each other frequently. Sanders suffered abused drugs and was admitted to a mental hospital on two occasions with drug-induced psychosis.7. The first of the offences mentioned above, wounding with intent, took place in February 2000. On 29th February 2000, Sanders attended a Shrewsbury hospital with wounds to the back of his head. There was extensive bruising and swelling to the back of his skull. He said he had fallen down a flight of stairs. The inference is that he colluded with and/or was persuaded by the offender to conceal the truth, namely that the offender had assaulted him. In early April 2000 Sanders was again admitted to a mental hospital, where he remained as an in-patient until late May 2000.8. Sanders then went missing. On 27th or 28th May, the offender killed him. He severed his head from his body with an axe or some other heavy implement with a sharp edge. He then took him in a vehicle to a park just south of Birmingham and left the head and body there. A member of the public discovered them as he was walking his dog early one morning. This killing eventually led to the offender's conviction for murder.9. Shortly afterwards, the offender was arrested for the murder, but released. Soon after his release, he killed Faulkes. This led to his plea of guilty to manslaughter on the ground of diminished responsibility. On 12th May, he attempted to kill his mother. His plea of guilty to an offence under S18 of the Offences Against The Person Act in relation to this offence was not accepted, and he was convicted of attempted murder. Both attacks were carried out in a similar way, namely with an axe or some similar weapon.10. It now falls to me to determine the minimum term to be served by the offender, pursuant to Schedule 22 paragraph 6 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. In setting the appropriate term I must take into account the seriousness of the offence, and in doing so must consider the general principles in Schedule 21 of the 2003 Act. I must have regard to the recommendation which, as trial judge, I made to the Lord Chief Justice, namely sixteen years. Because of the change in procedure at the time, the Lord Chief Justice did not consider the recommendation, and the Home Secretary did not fix a tariff. I must have regard to the guidelines applicable at the time of the offence and must ensure that the term set complies with Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Schedule 22/8(a)) and the guidance provided by the Consolidated Criminal Practice Direction (29th July 2004) (“the CCPD”) paragraph IV.49, so as to ensure that the sentence does not breach the principle of retroactivity. The CCPD explains the correct approach to looking at the practice of the Home Secretary before December 2002 for the purpose of Schedule 22 of the 2003 Act, in the light of the judgment in R v Sullivan, Gibbs, Elener and Elener (2005) 1 Cr App R 3. I have also had regard to the provisions of section 67 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967 relating to the time spent in custody on remand.11. I have read and considered Victim Impact Statements from the offender's mother; from Russell Sanders Royle, the father of Julian Sanders; and Charles Foulkes, the father of Colin Foulkes. The statement of Mr. Royle is of particular relevance, as his son was the victim of the case I am now considering. I have also considered written representations made on the offender's behalf.12. Under the principles set out in Schedule 21, the starting point for determination of the minimum term is 15 years. Whilst the offence had horrifying aspects, none of the features set out in paragraphs 4(2) or 5(2) of the Schedule were present. Accordingly the 15 year starting point provided by paragraph 6 applies, subject to increase or reduction for aggravating or mitigating features, examples of which were set out.13. Since the murder was committed before 1st June 2002, the appropriate starting point indicated as appropriate by the CCPD in determining the practice of the Secretary of State at the material time is to be assessed by reference to the letter of guidance dated 10th February 1997 sent by Lord Bingham, then Chief Justice, to the judges. This letter provided a starting point for an “average” or “unexceptional” murder of 14 years, but subject to increase or reduction for aggravating or mitigating features, examples of which were set out.14. I considered, when making my recommendation about the minimum term following sentence, the aggravating and mitigating features as they appeared to me at that time. This recommendation was based on the Practice Statement of Lord Woolf, handed down on 31st May 2002. That Practice Statement was formulated in different terms from the guidance in Lord Bingham's letter. The CCPD (which post-dated the sentence) made it clear that the latter rather than the former which applied to the present case. Further, the CCPD provides that I should have regard to the principles in Schedule 21, which was not in force when sentence was passed in this case. Accordingly, whilst keeping in mind my original recommendation, I think it appropriate to consider afresh the length of the minimum term appropriate to the seriousness of the offence.15. As it seems to me, this offence is significantly more serious that the “average” or “unexceptional” murder for which Lord Bingham considered a starting point of 14 years appropriate. Whilst the offender did not have a criminal record for violence, he had quite soon before the murder carried out a very serious and potentially lethal attack on the same victim. As regards the facts of the murder, the precise events leading up to it cannot be fully known. After his conviction and sentence, the offender admitted that he had killed the victim, and gave an account of what happened. The offender's account led to his second unsuccessful appeal against conviction, in which the Court of Appeal was invited to hear fresh evidence from the offender's psychiatrist to show that, had the full facts been known at trial, the offender might have been found not guilty of murder but guilty of manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility.16. The Court of Appeal declined to hear fresh evidence. The Court was presented with the offender's explanations about why the issue of mental illness had not been raised before. The court observed (paragraph 29 of the judgment): “….these explanations demonstrate what the prosecution have fairly described as a deliberate tactical decision not allow the offence of diminished responsibility to be investigated because the appellant believed he had a good chance of acquittal based on his denial of any responsibility. We cannot accept the submission that it was the mental illness which gave rise to these attempts to evade responsibility. Moreover the appellant's conduct after the killing, by way of attempting to dispose of the body and by his persistent denials of involvement tend to confirm the statement he made to Dr Collins that 'he hoped to get away with it'. He persisted in his denial following his arrest for the killing of Faulkes and his “hope” succeeded to the extent of a jury disagreement on the Sanders count at the first trial. The appellant persisted in denying involvement at the time of the retrial at which he was convicted and until his application for leave had been refused.”17. When making my original recommendation, I gave weight to the likelihood that the offender was under the influence of mental illness or of some personality disorder at the time. I am still of that view; but in the light of the subsequent course of events and the conclusions drawn from them by the Court of Appeal, the weight to be given in mitigation to the mental state of the offender is limited. He has shown that he is devious and manipulative. These qualities are reflected in his actions after the killing. I note that, having admitted responsibility for the death of Sanders, the offender denied an intention to kill. On the evidence, I do not regard that denial as credible.18. As regards aggravating features, in my original recommendation I identified the brutal, deliberate and calculated manner of the killing, the previous attack, the planning involved in the disposal of the body and the efforts to conceal the evidence. I would add that, whilst this was not a case of “macabre…dismemberment of the body after death” (an aggravating feature mentioned by Lord Bingham: see CCPD IV.49.19 (11)), the very fact of causing death by decapitation is an especially horrifying feature of the case. This feature is referred to in Mr Royle's victim impact statement.19. Balancing the aggravating and mitigating features against one another, I have concluded that the minimum period to be fixed before the early release provisions are to apply should be 18 years. In my judgment the aggravating features very substantially outweigh the mitigating features. The time spent in custody on remand was 2 years 5 months and 2 days. Pursuant to the 1967 Act, this time must be deducted form the minimum period. Accordingly the minimum period will be fixed at 15 years 6 months and 28 days.20. I would add this. The question of whether, if at all, the offender is ever released, depends not primarily on the seriousness of the offence, but on an assessment long in the future of whether the offender remains dangerous. That will be for others to decide, not me. But when I made my original recommendation, I said: “As a consequence of his personality disorder and/or psychiatric illness the defendant is likely to represent a serious danger for the indefinite future”. I remain of that view. The fact that after this murder, the offender killed another person, and attempted to kill his mother, indicates the extent of that danger. The appellant's mother, one of his victims, remains sympathetic to him; but considers that she would be at risk were he ever released. I consider that she and others would be at serious risk for the foreseeable future.